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Foreword 
The history of the United Nations' involvement in the former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1995 continues to 
be a subject of intense debate. The disintegration of Yugoslavia - an event which had long been predicted 
by analysts and historians of the region - was always bound to present the UN with severe challenges. As 
an organisation, it was structurally ill-equipped to meet the kind of challenge which the scale and complex-
ity of peacekeeping in the former YUgoslavia gradually began to assume. Not only did it lack the necessary 
resources but, more profoundly, the UN Charter was primarily designed to address conflicts between, not 
within, states. The Yugoslav wars of succession contained elements of both civil lmd international war. 
The difficulties encountered by the UN in the former Yugoslavia stemmed above all, however, from the 
competing priorities and interests of key member states in relation to the conflict. Indeed, from the outset 
member states disagreed profoundly about the origins and the true nature of the conflict. Such disagree-
ments made it nearly impossible to develop a coherent international policy towards the conflict. It also 
placed the UN in an increasingly difficult position as various countries resorted to the UN as a substitute 
for their own lack of policy or, worse still, as an instrument through which, in the words of dr Sundnes, 
"separate agendas" could be pursued. 
Knut O. Sundnes provides a highly personal account of the pressures that were placed on the UN's 
medical support system at the time when he was serving as Force Medical Operations and Planning 
Officer with UN forces in the former Yugoslavia. As with an increasing number of studies and accounts 
of the conflict, Sundnes shows that much of the criticisms directed towards the UN in the former Yugo-
slavia have been, at the very least, misplaced. Specifically, his story throws new light on the policies of 
major powers in relation to certain aspects of the conflict and adds to our understanding of the constraints 
under which the UN was forced to operate. It also alludes to events which the American government in 
particular has chosen to downplay and largely ignore: "the atrocities and massive human rights violations 
committed by Croat forces during and in the aftermath of their Krajina offensive".' For all these reasons, 
this is a welcome and important contribution to the ongoing debate about the UN's performance in the 
former Yugoslavia. 
Mats Berdal 
London, September 1996 
IFS Into 4/96 5 
Introduction 
Traditional United Nations peacekeeping is based on 
consent, impartiality and minimum use of force. 
Ideally above politics, a peacekeeping force is 
deployed expressly as a neutral third party to assist 
warring parties in reaching a peaceful solution to 
their conflicts. Nevertheless, elements of the national 
politics of troop contributing nations have influenced 
many missions, to the extent that the UN chain of 
command bas been bypassed and sometimes even 
counteracted. Until recently, however, political 
interference by troop contributing countries has not 
had any marked effect on the overall performance, 
and the honest commitment of the UN and troop 
contributor bas rarely been doubted or challenged. 
Inevitably there will always be an element of politics 
attached to such missions and, to some extent, 
secondary political objectives can also be accepted as 
long as they are conducted openly and kept in check. 
During the last couple of years, however, this seems to 
have changed. A number of ' 'hidden agendas" have 
come to light, most clearly so in operations where the 
pennanent members of the Security COlmcil have also 
been troop contnDuting nations. 
In a conflict situation, medical and other humani-
tarian activities can serve as a means of entry into 
otherwise closed areas. In spite of their ethical 
importance, such services have often been used for 
other political purposes, and the mixing of medico-
humanitarian and politically-motivated concerns may 
soon reach critical proportions. In the conflict in the 
Former Yugoslavia, this limit was exceeded on 
severnl occasions by the UN and even more so by 
prominent troop contributing nations, with the United 
States dominating the picture. The pupose of this 
paper is to show the effect of these trends on some 
of the medical and humanitarian support services of 
the United Nations Peace Force in the Former 
Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR). 
The UN in the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia 
Between 1992 and 1995, UN forces in the Former 
Yugoslavia were given a range of tasks and three 
different commands, each with different mandates, 
which only added confusiop. to the picture. As 
fighting continued, UNPROFOR was given addi-
tional tasks by the Security Council but did not 
have adequate resources to accomplish them. The 
establishment of the so-called "safe areas" in June 
1993 was the clearest example of the failure to 
match mandates with resources. The perceived 
failure of the UN to protect these vulnernble 
enclaves led to strong criticism of the organisation 
from various quarters, even though it was the 
member states themselves that had failed to 
provide the necessary number of troops. The 
tendency to add tasks without a corresponding 
increase in resources proved to be devastating. 
There are legislative problems as the UN is 
technically not a party to conflict and as such does 
not fall under the terms ofInternational Humanitar-
ian Law. Each of the troop contributing countries, 
however, has sigoed the Geneva and Hague 
Conventions. Moreover, to avoid any misunder-
standing it was clearly stated in the key manuals, 
including the Force Commanders Policy Directive 
20 (FCPD 20),2 that all UN troop contributors 
must in all respects adhere to the Geneva Conven-
tions and its Additional Protocols. Unfortunately, 
the warring factions were reluctantly "forced" to 
abide by International Humanitarian Law, but soon 
realised that their disrespect of legal obligations and 
denial of freedom of movement would have few, 
if any, negative consequences for them. As a result 
all the warring factions simply neglected these 
principles. They only respected International 
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Humanitarian Law and basic human rights when it 
was of advantage to their own cause. Even high-
ranking UN officers and officials appeared to lack 
a comprehensive understanding of these principles. 
In certain situations, respect for basic human 
rights even seemed to serve as a bargaining chip. 
Over time, contravention of International Humani-
tarian Law and the denial of freedom of movement 
became the norm, almost an unwritten "standard 
operational procedure". This was obstructive and 
in part devastating for the daily conduct of the 
mission and in the case of the medical support 
system, it even jeopardised the lives and health of 
the UN troops. 
Under circumstances such as those in the 
Former Yugoslavia between 1992 and 1995, the 
medical set-up in support of a UN mission -
including numbers and qualifications of personnel, 
equipment, medical supplies and site of deployment 
- must be comprehensive. Moreover, free access 
by dedicated medical teams - to all in need of 
medical attention (UN and warring factions) -
must be a non-negotiable principle, regardless of 
the causes of war. Even in areas where UN troops 
are denied freedom of movement, dedicated 
medical units must be allowed access. If access is 
denied, it has to be obtained immediately at the 
highest political level. Iflnternational Humanitarian 
Law is ignored by the parties and this is not 
remedied, how can one expect other UN resolu-
tions and multilateral agreements to be respected 
and abided by? Under the difficult circumstances in 
the Former Yugoslavia, International Humanitarian 
Law, respect for basic human rights and the 
principle of freedom of movement for UN person-
nel, could have played an important role in terms of 
reducing the excesses of war. The fact that this 
did not happen requires closer scrutiny. The 
manner in which the UN managed and conducted 
operations, at all levels, is no doubt partly to blame. 
Medical Support for Peacekeeping 
Operations 
Medical support in peacekeeping operations 
normally involves two elements. 
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1) UN Medical snpport for the 
peacekeeping troops 
The UN system for medical support involves four 
levels of medical care: 
• Level 1 is a national responsibility: a battalion aid 
station with medical first aid stations at company 
level being the most typical example. 
* Level 2 is a higher level of medical care and is a 
UN responsibility if a lead nation has been assigned 
the task (like INDOMEDBA Tin Croatia Com-
mand). Otherwise it is a national responsibility. 
Level 2 provides medical care for forces of regi-
ment and brigade size. This level of support usually 
includes a surgical component. 
• Level 3 is a UN responsibility and is always 
provided by a lead nation. A Level 3 unit is usually 
deployed with a force of brigade size or larger. 
Full surgical capacity is required as well as a 
treatment capacity of 30 days. 
• Level 4 is a UN responsibility but is normally 
carried out by each troop contributing nation. If 
the troop contributor does not have the necessary 
capacity for medical care, a lead nation will be 
allocated by the UN to support it. These decisions 
are often made on a case by case basis. 
The responsibilities and organisation of Level 3 
units in the Former Yugoslavia were set out in 
paragraph 32 of FCPD 20. For the purposes of this 
paper, it may be useful to quote this section: 
Level 3 medical treatment is a UN responsibil-
ity. There are three (3) UNPF Level 3 facilities: 
the US hospital (USHOSP) at Camp Pleso 
(Zagreb), the Norwegian field hospital 
MEDCOY/NORLOGBATwhich is located in 
Tuzla and the GermanlFrench hospital located 
near Trogir (Support Region Split (SRS)). All 
facilities are capable of providing up to' 60 beds 
for patient care. They are all !asked to assist the 
FHO in environmental hygiene inspections and 
training; and, provide medical evacuation teams 
for AIREVAC operations, when required 
[currently medevac teams are not provided by 
the US hospital and the French part of the 
7 
German/French hospital is responsible for 
medevacs from UNPROFORj.' Level 3 medical 
evacuation is accomplished by ground or air 
ambulances as described in Annex F. Level 3 
facilities must have a blood supply program. 
2) Humanitarian assistance 
All peacekeeping missions are either directly or 
indirectly humanitarian missions. In effect, UN 
medical units perform a dual function by providing 
direct humanitarian support to local civilians, as well 
as having full responsibility for medical support to 
UN contingents. The humanitarian obligations in the 
Former Yugoslavia are clearly set out in FCPD 20. 
Paragraph 17 states: 
HUMANITARIAN AlDILOCALCIVlLIAN 
MEDICAL CARE 
17. Humanitarian assistance is one of the primary 
missions ofUNPF. Medical units are here to 
provide support to UNPF. To the extent that it 
does not compromise their ability to care for 
UNPF casualties and patients, medical units 
should be involved in humanitarian assistance. 
Humanitarian assistance shall be given on tbe 
following criteria: 
a. a verified need 
b. lack of timely and adequate alternative 
c. high professional standards 
d. use ofNGO medical supply to the largest 
possible extent 
e. given as a temporary medical assistance 
f. emergency care to civilians shall be given in 
accordance with normal ethical standards, 
International Humanitarian Law and to the extent 
possible in co-ordination with the local health 
authorities. 
Military medical humanitarian assistance 
should be co-ordinated with the efforts of other 
UN and non-governmental relief agencies. Where 
a G5 cell exists, that is the proper co-ordination 
point. 
At its peak (August 1995) the UNPF medical support 
system comprised 298 physicians (including 62 
surgeons and 40 anaesthetists), more than 1200 
other health personnel, in addition to the support 
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elements. UNPF had three Level 3 hospitals, 6 Level 
2 hospitals, 18 Forward Surgical Teams, 140 soft-
skin ambulances and 142 armoured ambulances. 
Together with 4 helicopter units, adequate deploy-
ment and well-conceived Standard Operational 
Procedures, all resources needed were available for 
the effective overall provision of medical support. 
The three lead nations providing Level 3 medical 
care were the United States for United Nation 
Confidence Restoration, Croatia (UNCRO),' 
Norway (for UNPROFOR) and, from August 
1995, Germany (for UNPR,OFOR and parts of 
Sector South in UNCRO). The Czech Republic 
(UNCRO), France (Sector Sarajevo, UNPROFOR) 
and Indonesia (UNCRO) provided Level 2 medical 
care. 
All troop contributing nations in a UN mission 
are employed to assist the UN in fulfilling its 
mandate. All troop contributors entrust their troops 
to the UN, in the conviction that the UN provides 
the best medical care possible under the given 
circumstances and that all medical units are fully 
committed to the safety and well-being of their 
fellow peacekeepers. To accept "lead nation" 
responsibility for the provision of medical support 
in a peacekeeping operation is, therefore, an 
ethical, as well as a professional commitment. All 
the nations which prOVided higher level medical 
care either deployed personnel or executed their 
tasks in a way which reflected a variety of hidden 
agendas, which had different consequences for the 
performance of the overall medical support sys-
tem. This paper, which draws on personal experi-
ence in the field, describes how these "agendas" 
affected the quality of medical support and how 
different actors were prepared to sacrifice impor-
tant principles, including their responsibilities vis-a-
vis the troop contributors, and even violate basic 
medical ethical codes. 
Level 2: French, Czech and Indonesian 
Medical Support 
The French Medical Group in Sarajevo, including 
the French air ambulance detachment (DETALAT) 
in Split (Divulje) had an unofficial line of command 
which came to light by coincidence. This group, 
however, was fully committed to its allocated tasks 
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and sought to meet all needs within its area of 
responsibility, assisting UN troops as well as the 
warring factions. Similarly, the Czech hospital 
performed its duties effectively (sector south in 
UNCRO). It was the Indonesian Medical Battalion, 
however, which in all respects, proved to be 
UNPF's most flexible medical asset. The Level 2 
medical care units, therefore, gave little or no 
reason for concern regarding national priorities or 
hidden agendas, even though these did exist. 
Level 3: US and Norwegian hospitals 
By contrast, two of the Level 3 units deployed in 
theatre - the US hospital at Pleso outside Zagreb 
and the Norwegian hospital (NORHOSP) outside 
Tuzla - had hidden agendas and followed instruc-
tions which, in the US case, placed the life of UN 
personnel at considerable risk and in the Norwe-
gian case, could easily have done so. The third 
Level 3 unit - the German-French Hospital in 
Trogir outside Split - was deployed against the 
advice of the Force Medical Office, in favour of a 
cheaper, more compact, complete and well-tailored 
concept presented by the Belgians to UN months 
before the German offer. In this case the UN was 
pursuing political objectives rather than ensuring 
the optimal deployment of medical assets. This 
was no secret as it Was a deliberate choice of 
policy by the UN. In the two former cases, how-
ever, the hidden agendas only became apparent 
after deployment. The experience and performance 
of these units therefore merit special attention. 
The Role and Influence of the 
United States 
The role of the American hospital has to be seen 
within a larger framework. The strong US influ-
ence both within NATO and the UN Security 
Council was highlighted on several occasions. The 
US had also clearly taken sides in the conflict by 
branding the Serbs exclusively as the "bad guys". 
To those of us working alongside US personnel in 
the field, this was demonstrated on several occa-
sions; that the US violated the weapons embargo, 
directly or indirectly, was a well known secret. 
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When, during a Force Commanders Briefing, US 
Air Force officers from Operation Deny Fly were 
confronted with their highly selective monitoring of 
the ''No Fly" zone, no convincing answer was 
given. During the Croatian Krajina offensive in 
August 1995, US air support eliminated the two 
most important Serb launching pads for surface-
to-surface missiles' and there is also reason to 
belive that the US provided military advisers who 
were both civilians and military. 6 In Bosnia, US 
military advisers openly supported the Muslim 
forces, and on one occasion during springtime 
1995 the UN Brigadier General in command of 
Sector North-East was ordered, in spite of his own 
protests, to receive a US General who arrived at 
Tuzla air base with Muslim colleagues in a UN 
helicopter. 
The incursion of the regular Croatian Army 
(HV) into Bosnia and its active participation in the 
war in Bosnia alongside Bosnian-Croat forces 
(HVO) was silently accepted by the world commu-
nity. Increasingly, UNPF was forced to take 
drastic action by the US using its powerful position 
in the Security Council and in NATO. Such actions 
(notably air strikes) often endangered the lives and 
conditions of UN troops. The shell which landed in 
the market-place in Sarajevo on 30 August 1995 
was the most delicate of these incidents. It was 
used to justify the heavy bombing campaign by 
NATO aircraft which eventually turned the tide of 
the war. The UN observers normally charged with 
crater analysis, were denied access to the site and 
were later silenced by the military command 
system.7 Instead, a specially designated group was 
tasked to investigate this specific shelling. Simi-
larly, a demand by the Humanitarian Crisis Cell to 
investigate fresh mass graves and the atrocities 
which occurred in West-Slavonia following its 
recapture by Croat forces (HV) in May 1995, was 
side-stepped and no action was taken. Similar 
incidents occurred in Bosnia where only Muslim 
mass graves were investigated. The partiality of the 
US government was further demonstrated to the 
Field Medical Office when, on one occasion, the 
hospital commander denied us access to the 
paediatric drugs needed for refugees on the 
grounds that the refugees were Serb children. This 
9 
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was justified as being against US national orders 
that US troops should not assist in any humanitar-
ian actions benefitting the Serbs. Fortunately, this 
decision was overturned by the Commander of the 
Joint Task Forward Provide Promise (non-medi-
cal). However, the fact that US medical officers 
were prepared to violate the Geneva Convention on 
national orders, is a source of very serious con-
cern. From the point of view of the UNPF HQ, 
there was never any doubt that American personnel 
were pressurising the UN to pursue policies that 
were in accordance with US priorities. Several UN 
HQ staff (civilians and officers) were under the 
impression that US thinking overall failed to take 
account of the complexity of the situation on the 
ground. The US seemed neither capable nor willing 
to recognise the substantial differences between 
the various Serb factions and the fact that a great 
number of Serbs were also victims in the conflict. 
At the same time, the US largely ignored the more 
sinister aspects of Croat (HV and HVO) and 
Bosnian government policies. Considerable evi-
dence, for example, has now emerged regarding 
the atrocities and significant human rights viola-
tions committed by Croat forces during and in the 
aftermath of the Krajina offensive in August.' 
Finally, one of the original perpetrators of the 
conflict, the Serb politician Slobodan Milosevic, 
was invited to the negotiation table. Milosevic, 
together with President Tudjman, more than any of 
the Serb leaders already indicted by the War 
Crimes Tribunal in the Hague, deserves to be 
charged with war crimes. In short, the policies 
pursued by US certainly made the work of UNPF 
extremely difficult. 
The US Hospital 
The role of the US hospital and the national restric-
tions placed on it have to be understood in this 
wider perspective. Initially, following the imple-
mentation of US restrictions in late spring/early 
summer 1994, various episodes were considered 
mere mishaps and/or understandable short-term 
measures for safety reasons. Gradually, however, 
it became clear that the US medical contribution 
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reflected priorities which differed from those 
which should govern the provision of medical 
support in a war zone. 
During the summer of 1994, US authorities 
issued instructions that no US soldier from the US 
hospital was allowed to leave Zagreb. With the 
exception of a short period during the Croatian 
attack on West-Slavonia in early May 1995, this 
order also included medical evacuations by air and 
ground forces. As a result (and without prior 
warning), 15,000 UN troops (in Croatia Command) 
were deprived of this crucial element in their 
medical support system as no feasible back-up 
system was available. Already in late summer 
1994, a Canadian soldier, who had suffered war 
wounds in Sector South, was refused medical 
assistance on the grounds that US national restric-
tions did not permit his evacuation. Permission was 
requested from the Commander of Joint Task 
Forward Provide Promise (JFTPP) in Zagreb who, 
himself unwilling to make an exception, forwarded 
the request to Joint Task Forward HQ in Naples in 
Italy. After 90 minutes the request was rejected. 
This caused an unexpected and dangerous delay in 
the medical evacuation of the Canadian soldier and 
improvised measures had to be taken. More 
importantly, this incident was only one in a series 
of similar episodes that were to follow. 
As a result, when a battalion in UNCRO had 
casualties or other emergency medical conditions 
which required Level 3 care, the battalion had to 
provide both the medical crew and the equipment 
needed during the transport itself. This was 
unfortunate for all "delivering" units, especially for 
battalions with rather meager resources, such as 
KENBA T which only had one physician. As the 
restrictions of movement imposed by the warring 
factions sometimes prevented the return of these 
doctors for more than 24 hours, units could be left 
in a rather vulnerable situation with regard to 
medical support. To some extent US national 
restrictions were understood (but not accepted) as 
long as it involved US soldiers entering into Serb-
held territory. However, once it became clear that 
they included any medical assistance, even after 
traffic accidents in HV -controlled Croatia (from 
Karlovac hospital or collecting patients from Split), 
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the situation became difficult to understand and 
impossible to accept. 
In winter 1994-1995, following several at-
tempts to have these restrictions lifted, the Force 
Medical Office (FMEDO) was informed, infor-
mally, that US authorities had no wish to stay on in 
Pleso and that they would withdraw the hospital 
immediately if the Field Medical Officer did not 
stop "harrassing" them. To find a replacement at 
short notice was, however, difficult and the Force 
Medical Office had reluctantly to accept the 
intolerable situation. After the seizure ofKrajina 
(Sector North and South) by the Croats, a reor-
ganization of the UN set-up in Croatia was re-
quired. As the US hospital was now a surplus 
requirement, it was suggested by the FMEDO that 
it should be withdrawn and replaced either by 
INDOMEDBAT, or alternatively by the Czech 
Forward Surgical Team. This suggestion was not 
welcomed by the Americans and, all of a sudden, 
numerous efforts were made by the US to ensure 
that their presence at Camp Pleso would continue. 
They even offered to participate in medical evacua-
tions "as there was no enemy territory anymore!'" 
However, they refused to provide medical evacua-
tion from East-Slavonia which was still the part of 
the Republic of Serbian Krajina. 
US staff officers at the FMEDO, 
UNPF HQ 
At the end of November 1994, existing US restric-
tions were extended to include any US medical 
officer regardless of whether they were directly 
responsible to the Field Medical Office or belonged 
to the hospital. As this included the Deputy Force 
Medical Officer (DFMEDO), the Force Hygiene 
Officer (FHO) and the Medical Supply Officer 
(MSO) it became next to impossible for these 
officers to fulfil their jobs. The Field Medical 
Office raised the issue with the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York, 
both directly with the medical adviser and through 
the Chief of Staff/Logistics and Administration 
(COSlLog&Adm) at UNPF HQ in Zagreb 
(Brig. General), but without any result. The only 
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response was an oral and off-the-record statement 
from the US ambassador to the UN, Madeleine 
Albright, requesting that the UN stop insulting the 
US. As a result, the FMEDO let it be known to 
both the DPKO in New York and the US authorities 
through JTFPP in Zagreb, that if the restrictions 
Were not lifted, US officers would have to be 
replaced by officers from nations without restric-
tions. \0 After a temporary easing of the restrictions, 
shortly before rotation, the restrictions tightened 
again and became not only untenable but also 
ridiculous; for example, the. DFMEDO was unable 
to attend INDOMEDBAT's medal parade at which 
he had been invited to hand out the UN medals. 
This took place long after the area was under the 
control of Croat forces. When one of the Force 
Hygiene Officers (from the US) tried to push this 
issue he was informed, in a meeting with a US 
admiral based in Naples, that these restrictions 
were Presidential Orders and that he had to under-
stand that his presence was more complex than 
simply being a UNPF Force Hygiene Officer. 
During the Croatian capture of West-Slavonia, 
information about the poor conditions in the 
temporary camps for the Serbs reached the 
FMEDO. As these camps were outside even the 
previous demarcation line for Sector West, the 
acting FMEDO decided to send the Force Hygiene 
Officer (US officer) on a hygiene inspection. This 
request was tomed down without explanation. If 
the refusal had come from Croat authorities we 
might have understood but the request was turned 
down by US authorities." As it transpired, the 
Force Medical Officer had virtually no say in how 
to use the US officers put under his command - an 
impossible and intolerable situation. Any trip made 
by these officers had to be planned well in advance 
(7-10 days) and applications had to be sent to the 
JTF HQ in Naples. In each case, the request had to 
be so specific and detailed that it would have been 
impossible to make any ad hoc decicions or 
inspections. The majority of these requests were 
rejected, sometimes on grounds ofSecurity, and at 
others for "professional" reasons (without consult-
ing other medical or public health professionals). 
No other nation could have behaved in this way 
without serious consequences. 
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Only one US officer was pennitted to travel 
with very few restrictions (within Muslim-control-
led territory): the Humanitarian Officer (G5) in 
Sector North-East in Bosnia. The US authorities 
insisted on this post, regardless of the fact that the 
officer in question clearly had no intention of ever 
crossing the front line in order to ascertain humani-
tarian needs on the Serbian-side. This officer was 
frequently observed along the front line together 
with high-ranking Bosnian officers. In due course, 
before the rotation of this position in spring 1995, a 
letter was drafted by the author and sent by the 
COS/Log&Adm for DPKO in New York where we 
underlined the need for the G5 officer, provided by 
a troop contributing nation with no national restric-
tions whatsoever that could prevent the officer 
from crossing the front line, as there was also an 
obvious need to check the humanitarian and 
medical requirements of civilians on the Serb side. 
different nations, US crews were exposed to no 
more risk than any other medical crew which had 
to replace them. US restrictions meant that other 
nations had to take risks on behalf of US officers 
who had been deployed to do the job. This stands 
in remarkable contrast to the efforts and actions 
set in motion to save a single US Air Force pilot 
trapped in Serb-held Bosnian territory. All in all, US 
activities in Fonner Yugoslavia made the situation 
worse for the UN troops and increased the need 
for the medical support that the US was obliged, 
but unwilling to give. 
The US battalion deployed in Macedonia had 
also restrictions. Within its area of responsebility 
one observation post was manned by Norwegian 
troops. The reason given was that this observation 
post was too close to the border of Yugoslavia. 
Otherwise we felt that many basic needs would not FMEDO and the US officers 
be met and that this could also have considerable 
negative consequences for the UN image of 
impartiality. Not surprisingly, the next G5 officer 
in Tuzla was neverthless provided by US. 
To sum up, US authorities deployed a medical 
unit, but did not allow this unit to fulfill its commit-
ments in serving the UN troops. When they were 
finally asked to withdraw the unit and give way to 
another lead nation, operating without such obvi-
ous restrictions, they were unwilling to do so. 
Consequently the FMEDO found it difficult to 
believe, all episodes taken into account, that the 
prime objective of US deployment was to serve the 
UN troops. We felt that its prime purpose was to 
serve as a cover for other US activities related to 
the Croat and Muslim authorities.12 As a result, UN 
requests for support were only met when they did 
not conflict with US interests, and were at any rate 
treated as low priority. This "hidden" agenda was 
difficult to hide and was known to all actors, 
including the various Serb factions. As a conse-
quence, US soldiers were exposed to greater risk. 
Medical personnel should, however, in such 
situations, act in accordance with and claim 
protection pursuant to the Geneva Convention and 
Protocols. Moreover, as the helicopter unit operat-
ing out of Zagreb was civilian and was used by 
12 
In 1993-1994 all positions in the FMEDO (for 
UNPROFOR as a whole) were held by the US 
officers. In the spring of 1994, Norway was 
requested to fill the position of Force Medical 
Officer (FMEDO) from September 1994. In 
summer 1994 Norway was also asked by the UN 
Headquarters in New York to fill the position of 
Deputy Force Medical Officer at the level of Lt. 
Colonel. The author accepted a request from the 
Norwegian authorities to fill this post. Before my 
arrival in theatre, however, the US had sent, 
uninvited, a medical officer with the rank of full 
Colonel. Clearly, the idea was to fill the post before 
the arrival of the officially invited FMEDO. This 
failed, and the only other possible position for a full 
Colonel was the Deputy FMEDO, even though this 
was listed as a Lt. Col. position. I was then asked 
to assume the post of Force Medical Operations 
and Planning Officer instead, as the US Colonel 
would otherwise have to be sent home. I accepted. 
The Headquarters in New York was infonned 
about the unfortunate situation created by the US 
authorities, but considered the incident to be a 
mishap. It was made clear, however, that during 
the next rotation of US officers (end of February 
1995), such mishaps would not be accepted, the 
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incoming officer would have to have the rank of 
Lt. Colonel and would take over the position of 
Medical Operations and Planning Officer, while I 
would assume the position to which I had origi-
nally been appointed. The name of the incoming 
officer was then given with the rank of Lt.Col. On 
arrival, however, it was clear that the incoming 
officer was a medical doctor who had had the rank 
of full Colonel for many years. He had also known 
for some time that he would be sent to UNPF HQ. 
The actions of the US authorities could no longer 
be regarded as mere mishaps but rather were seen 
as an attempt to manipulate the UN system, 
perhaps only for the sole purpose of complying 
with the Presidental Declaration that "US soldiers 
shall exclusively be under the command of US 
officers". During the next rotation in August 1995, 
the DFMEDO position was filled by an Indonesian 
Lt.Col and the US was told not to send anyone. 
The FMEDO also informed the DPKO in New 
York that another nation should provide the Force 
Hygiene Offieer in the light of US restrictions. 
Denmark was recommended. Once again, how-
ever, a full Colonel was sent by the US to Zagreb 
and asked to be admitted to the staff. On this 
occassion, the UN stood firm and the officer had 
to return home. The Force Hygiene Officer, 
however, was replaced by another US officer. 
None of the US officers seemed to have been fully 
aware of the restrictions before arrival in theatre, 
and were caught by surprise. They were highly 
competent officers and were rather unhappy about 
this situation, as were the personnel at the US 
hospital. Nevertheless, they remained loyal to the 
US Command, ignoring UN orders whenever there 
was a conflict of interests. 
The Norwegian Hospital 
Norway's hidden agenda was less obvious and did 
not have the same grave consequences as the US 
agenda. Nevertheless, it was there. The deploy-
ment of the Norwegian hospital was part of a 
Nordic agreement and it was therefore decided that 
it should be located in the vicinity of Nordic 
forces. In terms of providing the most effective 
IFS Into 4/96 
support for UNPROFOR operations throughout 
Bosnia, the hospital should ideally have been more 
centrally located. Three requests were made for 
redeployment, all of which were rejected on 
political grounds. The decision to stay in Tuzla was 
clearly dictated by the desire to ensure the best 
possible medical support for Nordic troops. 
However, there were no other limitations on the 
use of the hospital's assets. Medical evacuation by 
air and on ground, as well as humanitarian assist-
ance on both sides of the front line, were con-
ducted to the complete satisfaction of the FMEDO. 
More disturbing, however, was the fact that 
after comprehensive withdrawal plans for 
UNPROFOR had been drawn up, conflicting 
instructions on how to use the Norwegian hospital 
and its personnel during a withdrawal were discov-
ered. Furthermore these instructions were only 
available in Norwegian. In the event of a with-
drawal they could have jeopardized the lives and 
safety ofthe other UN soldiers. Nordic soldiers 
were clearly given a higher priority than other UN 
contingents in the withdrawal plans. Fortunately, 
we never had to experience the practical conse-
quences of this hidden agenda. 
German-French Hospital 
The German-French hospital had no obvious hidden 
agenda, but its establishment highlighted that UN top 
officials were equally influenced by political consid-
erations, as by the medical needs of the troops. It 
was clear that another hospital was needed in the 
southern part of Bosnia, preferably in the Support 
Region Split. Belgium had originally been asked to 
provide a suitable unit, to serve both as a holding 
station for the transfer of patients, and as a Level 3 
hospital for Support Region Split. A MEDEVAC 
function was also included. They were also asked to 
provide a hygiene team to cover the southern part of 
Bosnia. In early1995, Germany had already offered a 
hospital unit for UN peacekeeping operations in the 
Former Yugoslavia, provided that personnel did not 
have to enter Bosnia or any Serb-held territory. This 
was refused by FMEDO as it was of paramount 
importance that any additional medical asset complied 
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fully with the UN Support Manual and the Opera-
tional Procedures outlined.fuFCPD 20, But, fu the 
late spring of 1995, it became clear that, for political 
reasons, Gennany had been asked to provide a unit 
(not necessarily medical) for UNPF after all. The 
request was accepted by Gennany, but only a Field 
Surgical Hospital would be deployed. Details ofthis 
agreement were discussed thoroughly in a meeting 
between UNPF and the key nations in Paris. The 
FMEDO, however, was not fuvited! Despite our 
strong recommendation agafust such a deployment 
(see Level 3 medical support), based on an assess-
ment of needs and as a matter ofpriniciple, FMEDO 
was overruled. In order to bolster the Gennan unit, 
France accepted to provide a unit for the hospital, to 
perfonn all functions not covered by Gennany, 
notably MEDEVAC Teams and a Hygiene Team. 
When France finally deployed the unit, it became 
clear that they were only prepared to establish a 
holdfug station for French soldiers awaiting repatria-
tion for medical reasons. They never fulfilled their 
commitment as promised to the FMEDO and no 
political pressure was put on them to do so. As a 
result, we had another Level 3 unit incapable of 
meeting the minimum requirements laid down in 
written agreements and the Force Commanders 
Manuals. 
Conclusion 
This paper examines how the medical and humani-
tarian support services in the Former Yugoslavia 
were both politicised and hijacked at certain 
crucial stages of the conflict. Medical support has 
long been used as a means of gaining access to 
more or less closed areas, as well as to monitor 
violations ofInternational Humanitarian Law 
(comprising the Geneva Convention of 1949, its 
Additional Protocols of 1977, and the Hague 
Convention of 1907). Medical support, such as 
that provided by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) during conflict, has also 
been an important means of monitoring human 
rights violations. Whenever medical support is 
provided, the Physicians Ethical Code and Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law have been, and should 
remain, non-negotiable principles. In the Fonner 
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Yugoslavia, however, an unfortunate amalgamation 
of politics and medical "power" was observed 
both on the part of the UN but even more so on 
the part of troop contributing nations, especially 
the United States. Any such dual approach to 
conflict, as I attempted to show using the manage-
ment of conflict in Fonner Yugoslavia as an 
example, is inconsistent with an impartial and 
objective approach to conflict. A troop contribut-
ing country, in particular, cannot be both inside 
and outside the UN system at the same time. 
Any action which threatens to undennine the 
impartiality, honesty and ethical integrity of UN 
personnel in a peacekeeping operation, represents 
a danger to the mission as a whole. It will inevita-
bly generate mistrust in the UN system, especially 
on the part of the warring factions, but also on the 
part of those who provide resources for the 
mission in good faith. This in turn will make it 
increasingly difficult to find nations or persons 
willing to serve in UN missions. If the safety and 
security of UN troops, as well as the protection of 
basic human rights and adherence to International 
Humanitarian Law become bargaining chips, we 
will inevitably be fighting a loosing battle for the 
future of UN peacekeeping. Abusing the medical 
support system for political reasons is both 
unethical and illegal. It must be vigorously op-
posed by all those who are anxious to preserve UN 
peacekeeping as an instrument for mitigating and, 
where possible, resolving conflicts. 
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Abbreviations 
AlREVAC Air evacuation 
COS/Log&Adm Chief of Staff, logistics and 
administration 
DETALAT The French detachment for air 
ambulance and transport 
DFMEDO Deputy Force Medical Officer 
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (New York) 
~, ECMM European Community 
Monitoring Mission 
FCPD Force Commanders Policy 
Directive 
FHO Force Hygiene Officer 
G5 Humanitarian Officer 
HVO Bosnian Croat forces 
ICRC International Committee of the 
Red Cross 
INDOMEDBAT Indonesian Medical Battalion 
KENBAT Kenyan Battalion 
MEDCOY Medical Company 
MSO Medical Supply Office 
NGO Non-governmental organisation 
NORHOSP Norwegian hospital, Tuzla 
NORLOGBAT Norwegian Logistic Batallion, 
Tuzla 
POW Prisoner of War 
SRS Support Region Split 
UNCRO United Nations Confidence 
Restoration Operation (Croatia) 
UNMO United Nations Military 
Oberver 
UNPF United Nations Peace Force 
USHOSP United States Hospital 
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Notes 
I P. 10. Sadly, harassment and human rights 
violations by members of the Croatian military and 
police against the remaining Serb population in the 
Krajina and Western Slavonia regions continue to 
his day. See, SC/6267, Presidential Statement 
concerning Croatia's Failure to Execute Arrest 
Warrants ofthe International Tribunal on Former 
Yugoslavia, 20 September 1996. 
2 FCPD 20 was the Standard Operational Proce-
dure (SOP) for all medical activities in 
UNPROFOR (UNPF after April I , 1995). 
3 The sentence in brackets (italics in this paper 
only) was added to the latest version of FCPD 20 
(September 1995). In the 1994 version this exemp-
tion was not included. 
4 Due to the impractical location of the Norwegian 
hospital (in Tuzla) several patients from the south-
ern parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina were evacuated to 
US hospital at Camp Pleso instead of transporting 
them to Tuzla. 
, This was communicated by an HV medical 
officer to a German medical officer in Split. The 
HV officer, who had dual citizenship (German and 
HV) had participated in the recapturing of Knin. 
Later this was openly confirmed in Time Maga-
zine, August 14 1995 (p. 15-18). In Time Maga-
zine January 15,1996 a system of civilian US 
military advicers is outlined. There is reason to 
believe that a similar system also existed earlier. 
6 There were some indications of such activities 
Otherwise it is difficult to explain how Croatia 
could be able to build up such a well equipped and 
well functioning army from scratch during an 
extremely short period of time (less than three 
years) during a wepaon embargo. There are also 
indications that the Krk International Airport served 
as a port of entry for illegal weapons import. 
7 This information was given by a UN military 
observer who strongly felt that the ethical commit-
ment and impartiality of the UN was suffering to 
the extent that he was considering terminating his 
contract. According to his information, UNMO had 
checked the landing site of the shell after the 
special group had withdrawn and their conclusion 
was that it was impossible to state exactly from 
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where the granade had been launched. This con-
clusion was also supported by the first oral report 
from the mortar radar unit which had not identified 
any origin of a shelling. 
8 See, in particular, ECMM (European Community 
Monitoring Mission) report from September 1995. 
9 Statement given in a meeting, September 13 
1995, chaired by COSlLog and Adm. 
10 The FMEDO wrote numerous letters regarding 
this issue. Written responses were, however, few 
and far between. 
11 On the whole, we did not know at what level the 
requests were refused as these, almost without 
exception, were communicated by phone, in spite 
of the FMEDO demanding to have them in writ-
ing. 
12 There was some indication of such activities. 
High-ranking US officers were observed being 
transported with high-ranking Bosnian offiser in 
Bosnia. 
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